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SPECIALIZATION OR DIVERSIFICATION? 
A BASIC POLICY DECISION CONFRONTING 
ECONOMICALLY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES" 
Introduction 
E CONOMISTS have become increasingly concerned during the past ten or fifteen years with the matter of 
economic growth. Currently an unprecedented effort is being 
made by theorists and empirical researcl~ers to discover what 
is required to initiate and sustain growth of national per 
capita outputs. In part this is the result of anxiety over the 
future prospects of the relatively wealthy national economies 
which has been aroused by the demonstrated cyclical in- 
stability of these economies; but the more novel and im- 
portant factor responsible for the recent emphasis upon 
growth economics is interest in the plight of the poorer, 
economically underdeveloped two-thirds of the world and 
the problem of breaking the grip of the crushing poverty that 
prevails. 
As a consequence of the realignment of the world power 
system following World War 11, the economically under- 
developed countries have taken on an entirely new signifi- 
cance. A new nationalism Bas sprung up in these countries 
which has manifested itself in demands for political inde- 
pendence and an end to increasing economic inequality. 
This, coupled with the schism between East and West, has 
resulted in a fundamental change in the international politi- 
cal situation, The underdeveloped countries, with their 
newly-awakened national pride and their newly-acquired 
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economic aspirations, find themselves in the pivotal position 
in the world struggle; and their intention to capitalize on 
this situation is abundantly clear. 
While it is generally agreed on all sides that the aim of 
policy in these countries must be the alleviation of the pre- 
vailing poverty by increasing the per capita level of income, 
the means best employed in attempting to accomplish this 
are in dispute. One group of economists advises policies 
consistent with the dictates of classical or orthodox economic 
theory as it  was developed by Adam Smith and his followers 
in the classical school. Another group of economists takes the 
- 
position that this body of theory is not relevant to the prob- 
lems of the underdeveloped countries. The latter group 
naturally advises quite different policies than the former. 
The split within the ranks of economists is perhaps most 
clearly apparent from the differences in policies advised in 
connection with one of the most fundamental decisions with 
which the leaders in the underdeveloped countries are con- 
fronted; namely, whethela in their respective national econo- 
mies growth will be best promoted by unplanned, market- 
directed specialization of production, or by planned, govern- 
ment-sponsored diversification of production. The choice 
which is mzde in this matter not only is likely to influence 
the chances of attaining rapid and sustained improvement 
in material standards of living in these countries but also 
is likely to aflect the character of economic and political 
institutions which will evolve as economic development takes 
place. 
I1 
The Classical Theory and Its Criticism 
One of the cornerstones of classical economic theory is the 
proposition that market-determined specialization in produc- 
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tion (Adam Smith used the term "division of labor") pro- 
motes economic well-being by making possible a greater 
volume of output, and hence a higher-level per capita in- 
come, from a given application of resources. Accordingly, 
rational pursuit of economic self-interest, whether on the 
part of individuals or national economies, requires the appli- 
cation of available resources to the production of those 
goods and services whicl~ can be produced with greatest 
relative efficiency, and the exchange of some part of the 
resulting output for that of others concentrating their pro- 
ductive efforts along lines consistent with their own resource 
endowments. 
This proposition is known as the "doctrine of comparative 
advantage." As applied to national economies the argument 
for specializing in accordance with the dictates of compara- 
tive advantage is the following: One country can benefit 
itself economically by specializing in the production of those 
things in which it has a comparative advantage because, by 
exchanging some part of its output for that produced by 
other countries, it will be enabled to obtain a larger aggre- 
gate volume of goods and services (and perhaps a greater 
variety and better quality as well) from a given expenditure 
of resources. Thus, given well-functioning domestic markets 
for factors of production and international markets for goods 
and services, national specialization coupled with free inter- 
national trade is supposed to afford a means of promoting a 
country's productivity and economic growth; and this in 
harmony with, rather than at the expense of, other countries.' 
The logic of the comparative advantage doctrine has al- 
ways impressed economists and statesmen imbued with the 
viewpoint of the advanced, industrial countries much more 
than it has those intent upon fostering the economic growth 
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of relatively backward countries engaged principally in the 
production of foodstuffs and raw materials. Spokesmen for 
these latter countries argue that the classical doctrine is in- 
appropriate as a guide to policy fornulation where the 
promotion of economic growth is the object; that adherence 
to the dictates of the doctrine would jeopardize the long-run 
growth potentids of their countries. In their view, the growth 
of economies which are initially predominantly agricultural 
requires the planned establislvnent of diversification as be- 
tween primary and industrial production; i.e., requires gov- 
ernment-sponsored industrialization beyond what would be 
foi+thcoming from the operation of free market forces. Thus, 
they advocate policies calling for governmental interference 
with domestic and international market price relationships as 
the means of achieving the desired goal. 
I11 
The Issue Viewed Histo~ically 
Historically, the proposition that international division of 
labor coupled with free trade promotes the "wealth of 
nations" was first employed to attack mercantilist dogma. I t  
was the mercantilist view that national wealth and power 
were best fostered by government controls, especially those 
exercised over international trading relationships. It was also 
a tenet of mercantilism that industry and commerce were 
preferable to agriculture as branches of the national economy. 
The English classical economists (the most notable among 
whom, in addition to Adam Smith, were David Hume, David 
Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill) denied the inherent superior- 
ity of one line of economic activity over another. Further- 
more, they argued that mercantilist interference with special- 
ization and trade caused resources to be diverted from more 
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to less productive employments or, in other words, that assist- 
ance could be given to one sector of the economy only at a 
more than offsetting expense to the other sectors. 
The argument of the English classical economists based on 
the doctrine of comparative advantage (the doctrine itself 
being rigorously formulated for the first time during the 
course of the debate) won widespread popular acceptance in 
Britain, and the development of the British economy during 
the nineteenth century was largely in accordance with the 
classical model. However, in countries where industri a 1' iza- 
tion lagged behind that in Britain, the policy implications of 
the classical theory failed to command the same support. 
The course of United States economic development during 
the nineteenth century was substantially idluenced by the 
protectionism and economic nationalism of Alexander Hamil- 
ton and others following his lead. I t  was Hamilton's position 
that the government should actively promote the balanced 
growth of the economy rather than passively permit speciali- 
zation in agricultural production for the international market. 
He advocated that tariffs and "pecuniary bounties" (i.e., 
direct subsidies) be employed to protect domestic manu- 
facturing industry from foreign competition during an initial 
period of growth and consolidation in order to achieve the 
substantial degree of diversification in production and inde- 
pendence from foreign supplies which he believed to be 
necessary for the rapid economic growth of the country and 
the maintenance of political independence. A long history 
of protectionist tariff legislation aimed at promoting indus- 
trialization and broadening the domestic market testifies to 
the persuasiveness of this line of reasoning in this country. 
I n  Germany the classical doctrine was subjected to a 
rigorous theoretical challenge by the economist Friedrich 
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List. According to List, the English economists (and Adam 
Smith in particular) had overlooked the significance of 
differences in stages of economic development between 
countries. A nation desirous of increased productive and 
political power but whose "manfacturing power" was rela- 
tively underdeveloped should pursue policies which would 
promote a balance between agriculture and manufacturing 
industry. Only a f t e ~  a stage of development comparable to 
that of the most advanced industrial countries was achieved 
did the classical "cosmopolitical" argument for international 
laissex faize become valid. In List's view, therefore, what 
constituted appropriate policy for industrially-supreme Brit- 
ain was not appropriate policy for Germany and the United 
States, whose manufacturing industries were in their infancy. 
He advocated that the governments in Gelmany and the 
United States should follow policies which would promote 
increased internal trade while temporarily protecting do- 
mestic industry with a so-called "educational tariff." List's 
infant industry argument for protection inspired commercial 
policy in both countries. 
The forced industrialization of Japan during the latter half 
of the nineteenth century and the first part of this century 
was even further at odds with the liberal classical model. The 
state, motivated by a desire for increased economic strength 
which could serve as a base for political power and im- 
perialist expansion, actively promoted rapid industrializa- 
tion by means of tariffs and subsidies as well as by disect par- 
ticipation in the ownership and management of numerous 
industries. Soviet Russia's economic development, as is well 
known, has also been characterized by a ruthless policy of 
forced industrialization, The Russian exampIe of planned, 
forced industrialization carried out in an economy which was 
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initially predominantly agricultural and carried out in virtual 
isolation from the rest of the world represents the extreme 
of government intervention in economic activity and is, 
therefore, t l ~ e  antithesis of the classical model. 
IV 
Contemporary Debate Concerning the Relevance of 
Classical Model 
The question of the present-day relevance of the classical 
development model for the relatively poor, economically 
backward and predominantly agricultural countries is being 
vigorously debated in the literature on economic growth. 
The case for the position that the classical, comparative ad- 
vantage doctrine is not relevant to the problems of these 
countries seems to be based principally on a modern version 
of the infant industry argument, supported by certain statis- 
tical evidence which purports to show that specialization in 
primary production and rapid, sustained economic growth 
are incompatible. Defenders of the relevance of the classi- 
cal model to the problems of the underdeveloped countries, 
on the other hand, are arguing that on logical, practical, and 
factual grounds the critics' case is unconvincing and that 
these countries can ill afford to sacrifice the benefits which 
would flow from a division of labor in accordance with their 
respective comparative advantages. 
The modern version of the infant industry argument for 
government intervention has been expanded beyond the 
nineteenth century proposition that it is sometimes possible 
by means of ten~porary assistance to enable domestic indus- 
try to realize potential operating economies and competitive 
strength and, thereby, to bring about a better allocation of 
resources over the long run. A second point that is often 
made nowadays in favor of subsidizing the growth of in- 
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dustry is that certain "external economies" accompany indus- 
trialization, so that the social cost is below the private cost. 
Examples of such economies would be lower cost power, 
transportation, or communications as a result of increased 
scales of operations made possible by enlarged industrial 
demand for such services. A third argument for government 
encouragement of industrial expansion which is along much 
the same lines is that action is often necessary in the back- 
ward, agricultural countries to offset imperfections in the 
labor markets which prevent the movement of labor unpro- 
ductively employed in agriculture into more productive em- 
ployment in indu~try.~ 
Each of these arguments for subsidizing industrialization 
at the expense of agriculture is unassailable where conditions 
are such that the postulated economies can be made to ex- 
ceed the cost in terms of foregone production which the 
subsidization of industry entails. Opponents of government- 
directed resource diversion, when confronted by this ex- 
panded version of the old infant industry argument, are 
consequently forced to fall back on the purely practical 
objection that governments are not likely to be able either 
to discern accurately those eases in which the economies are 
realizable or to devise measures appropriate to their realiza- 
tion. 
There are, in addition, three major statistically-based argu- 
ments commonly employed to support the contention that 
primary production is neither an adequate nor a reliable base 
for rapid and sustained economic growth. First, there is the 
argument that because the prices of foodstu£Fs and raw ma- 
terials in the world market are subject to wide fluctuations 
in response to changes in business conditions in industrial- 
ized countries and to changes in supply, it is unwise to de- 
pend upon the exchange of these commodities for other goods 
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and services necessary to the development of a nation's 
economy. The related point is also often made that a high 
degree of specialization in the production of one or a few 
primary products makes the economy of the specializing 
country vulnerable to obsolescence as a consequence of 
technological changes (e.g., the development of synthetic 
substitutes) or change in consumer taste. A second major 
argument against specialization in the production of food- 
stuffs and raw materials is based on the claim that primary- 
producing countries tend to experience secular deteriora- 
tion in the terms upon which they are able to trade their 
commodities for manufactures, with the result that the gains 
from trade accrue in large measure to the industrialized 
countries. The third argument in this group is based on 
findings that countries with high per capita incomes generally 
have a high proportion of their populations engaged in manu- 
facturing industry, and that in high- and low-income coun- 
tries alike, per worker productivity is generally greater in 
manufacturing than in agricultural employments. 
How do the defenders of the present-day relevance of the 
classicaI doctrine meet these last tl~ree arguments? Taking up 
the arguments in reverse order, the principal points in tlle 
rebuttal to each appear to be t11e following: 
There is little quarrel with the statistical data wllich show 
that high-income countries generally have a high -proportion 
of their populations engaged in manufacturing and that in 
most countries labor productivity in manufacturing is above 
that in agriculture, altllougl~ some defenders delight in citing 
exceptions to the general pattern and others indicate skepti- 
cism as to the feasibility of any meaningfuI comparison of 
per capita incomes in advanced and underdeveloped coun- 
tries and of any reliable measurement of differences in the 
productivity of industrial and agricultural workers within the 
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same country. It is not the statistics, however, but rather the 
conclusions based on the statistics which have come in for 
the most telling criticism. I t  has been pointed out that it 
does not follow from these statistical correlations that higher 
per capita incomes and increased worker productivity can be 
achieved in predominantly agricultural countries merely by 
subsidizing the growth of manufacturing industry. Such 
reasoning is based upon the unwarranted assumptions that 
the correlations establish functional or causal relationships 
and, further, that they indicate in each case which are 
causes and which are effects. Actually, as the critics of this 
Iine of reasoning point out, these statistical data indicate 
nothing about whether policies directed toward overcoming 
backwardness and inefficiency in agriculture or policies 
directed toward the promotion of industrialization at the 
expense of agriculture are the most likely to bring about 
higher per capita incomes and increased labor productivity 
in countries initiaIly specializing in primaly production. 
The rebuttal to the terms of trade argument against spe- 
cialization in the production of primary products is some- 
what more involved. I11 the first place, the statistical data 
which purport to show that foodstuffs and raw materials 
exchange for manufactures in the world market on ever- 
worsening terms are challenged on numerous grounds, prin- 
cipal among which are the following: that the base year is 
arbitrarily selected; that inadequate allowances are made 
for changes in volume and composition of world trade, 
as well as for the quality of goods traded; that adjustments 
for transportation costs and changes in such costs are 
omitted or improperly made; and that the long-run move- 
ments in the terms upon which particular commodities have 
traded for manufactures have differed so widely that the 
experience of each individual country must be considered as 
14 The Rice Institute Pamphlet 
a separate case. In short, it has not been established statisti- 
cally to everyone's satisfaction that in the past, primary- 
producing countries generally have experienced a secular 
deterioration in terms upon which they have been able to 
trade their commodities for manufactures. 
Some defenders of the classical doctrine pursue the point 
further, however. They argue that even if it is granted that 
in the past the teims of trade have moved against primary 
producers, it does not follow that the trend will continue 
in the future. There are some reasons for believing that 
it might-e.g., Engel's law, the proposition that the income 
elasticity of demand for agricultural products is lower than 
that for industrial products-and some reasons for believing 
that it might not-e.g., the fact (if it is a fact) that the law 
of diminishing returns is particularly operative in the pro- 
duction of foodstuffs and raw materiaIs. Furthermore, they 
argue, even if it were reasonable for primary producers to 
expect future deterioration in their commodity terms of 
trade, it would not necessarily follow that they should expect 
the advantage from trading with the industrialized countries 
to be continuously diminished, since at the same time that 
commodity terms of trade worsen, the teims upon which 
domestic resources devoted to primary production are able 
to command foreign manufactures may improve as a result 
of production economies (i.e., there may result an improve- 
ment in the "factorial terms of trade"). And finally, so the 
rebuttal goes, even if both the commodity and factorial 
terms of trade do move against primary-producing countries 
in the future, there is no assurance that reallocation of re- 
sources from agriculture to industry would be advantageous 
since the cost in foregone production resulting from inefi- 
cient utilization of resources might exceed the loss stemming 
from the unfavorable movement in the terms of trade. 
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The third statistically-based argument against specializa- 
tion in the production of foodstuffs and raw materials, it will 
be recalled, is that the prices of these commodities are sub- 
ject to wide cyclical fluctuations in response to business con- 
ditions in the industrialized countries and to variations in 
the amount supplied on the world market. The statistical 
evidence is indisputable in this case, and it cannot be denied 
that countries exporting primary products often experience 
severe diEculties during periods of depressed commodity 
prices. Defenders of the classical development model, how- 
ever, deny that this situation justifies policies of forced in- 
dustrialization, claiming instead that it constitutes per- 
suasive evidence of the need for aggressive contracyclical 
monetary and fiscal measures in the primary-producing coun- 
tries and for international action designed to reduce the 
violence of business fluctuations, The argument for sub- 
sidized industrialization based on the related point that de- 
pendence upon the production and export of one or a few 
primary commodities makes an economy particularly vul- 
nerable to abrupt cessation of demand in the world market 
is rebutted differently. Defenders against this argument 
claim that government assistance to otherwise uneconomic 
industrial activities would not help overcome the problem 
since the assisted industries would be largely dependent upon 
domestic demand, which in turn hinges upon the prosperity 
of the agricultural sector. Thus, such industries would ex- 
perience difficulties whenever agricultural incomes declined, 
and therefore they would afford an ineffective hedge against 
the risk of econonlic dSculties resulting from technological 
change and change in consumer taste. 
So much for the major arguments being made in the can- 
temporary literature. Perhaps it should be emphasized that 
the question being debated is whether unplanned, market- 
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directed specialization of production or planned, govern- 
ment-sponsored diversification of production is the best or 
most desirable course for leaders in the under~levelo~ed 
countries to elect. I t  is not the position of either side in the 
debate that one course of action or the other is the only way 
by which economic growth can be achieved. 
v 
Resolution of the Issue in the World of Aflairs 
I11 the world of affairs, statesmen, not economists, make the 
decisions between alternative economic policies. In  those 
countries determined to take actions which will improve 
their positions economically, the choice between policies 
which will promote specialization and world trade and 
those which will promote diversification and national self- 
suEciency is made by political leaders. The advice of econo- 
mists may be solicited, but the choice in most instances is 
likely to be heavily conditioned by non-economic considera- 
tions. 
The spirit of nationalism wllicl~ prevails in many of the 
economically underdeveloped countries causes these coun- 
tries to be particularly attracted to policies which will pro- 
mote industrialization. The establishment of domestic manu- 
facturing industry seems to be regarded as demonstration 
of progressiveness, and it therefore serves as a means of en- 
hancing national prestige. Furthermore, the promotion of 
industrialization works to increase potential military strength 
and to reduce the threat of imperialist exploitation by the 
advanced, industrialized countries. It is not unreasonable to 
expect, therefore, that many of the underdeveloped coun- 
tries will elect to promote industria1ization even thougl~ 
their comparative advantages clearly lie in primary produc- 
tion. 
Public Addresses 17 
Unlike the nineteenth century when the growth of domes- 
tic industry was fostered principally by means of protective 
tariffs, today when it is national policy to promote domestic 
industrialization a large variety of economic controls are 
likely to be employed to frustrate the operation of market 
forces. One of the most striking developments of this cen- 
tury has been the increased complexity and comprehensive- 
ness of schemes for controlIing economic activity. Thus, not 
only are many of the underdeveloped countries likely to elect 
diversification rather than specialization as the means to 
achieve the economic growth which they desire, but they are 
likely to employ as the means central planning and control 
of a comprehensiveness beyond tlle imagination of nine- 
teenth century proponents of diversification. 
To the extent that countries are successful in developing 
their economies by these means, they are likely to emerge 
in the future as advanced countries with economies that are 
largely collectivist and government-directed rather than in- 
dividualistic and guided by private enterprise, In other 
words, when they take their place alongside the advanced 
countries their economies are likely to be more in accord 
with the Soviet than the American model. What the political 
significance of this likelihood is, and what it indicates United 
States policy toward the currently underdeveloped countries 
should be, I leave for those qualified to judge. 
Conclusion 
Whatever the long-1x11 political implications of the choice 
made by leaders in the underdeveloped countries between 
unplanned, market-directed specialization in production and 
planned, government-sponsored industrialization, the Iong- 
run economic danger is that the policies adopted will not 
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permit the fullest possible increase in productivity and im- 
provement in per capita levels of income. There is the danger 
that excessive nationalism may result in such severe malal- 
location of resources that economic growth over the long 
run will be impossible without an initial and perhaps pro- 
longed period of the severest sort of material sacrifice. On 
the other hand, there is the danger that excessive reliance 
- 
upon market forces to determine resource allocation may 
result in the currently underdeveloped countries being as- 
signed a permanent role in the worId productive system 
which is incompatible with their rapid and sustained eco- 
nomic growth. I t  will be tragic if, as a result of misguided 
policy decisions, the aspirations of the masses of the people 
for improvement in their economic lot are disappointed. 
NOTES 
1. Since production ordinarily takes place under conditions of increas- 
ing cost and since many goods and services cannot be traded 
internationally because of prohibitive transportation cost, perish- 
ability and so forth, national specialization in accordance with 
comparative advantage would normally fall far short of complete 
specialization; i.e., each country would normally produce a wide 
range of goods and services. 
2. There are, in addition to those cited in the text, two other theoreti- 
cally possible ways in which a country can benefit by means of 
protective tariffs, subsidies, or direct economic controls that are 
contrary to the spirit of the comparative advantage doctrine. Up 
to a point, protection afforded domestic industry will yield gains 
in the form of improved "terms of bade" (i.e., the ratio at which 
exports exchange for imports) greater than the losses imposed by 
the resulting inefficiency in resource allocation. Also, domestic 
unemployment may be alleviated by policies which result in a 
favorable balance of trade (i.e., an excess of exports over im- 
ports). However, in practice neither of these theoretical possibili- 
ties is of much im ortance because they are based on the unlikely 
assumption that %e countries at whose expense the gains are 
made would refrain from retaliation. 
